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Abstract
Background: In the late 1990s, in the context of renewed concerns of an influenza pandemic, countries such as
Ghana and Malawi established plans for the deployment of vaccines and vaccination strategies. A new pandemic
was declared in mid-June 2009, and by April 2011, Ghana and Malawi vaccinated 10% of the population. We
examine the public health policy perspectives on vaccination as a means to prevent the spread of infection under
post pandemic conditions.
Methods: In-depth interviews were conducted with 46 policymakers (Ghana, n = 24; Malawi, n = 22), identified
through snowballing sampling. Interviews were supplemented by field notes and the analysis of policy documents.
Results: The use of vaccination to interrupt the pandemic influenza was affected by delays in the procurement,
delivery and administration of vaccines, suboptimal vaccination coverage, refusals to be vaccinated, and the politics
behind vaccination strategies. More generally, rolling-out of vaccination after the transmission of the influenza virus
had abated was influenced by policymakers’ own financial incentives, and government and foreign policy
conditionality on vaccination. This led to confusion about targeting and coverage, with many policymakers justifying
that the vaccination of 10% of the population would establish herd immunity and so reduce future risk. Ghana
succeeded in vaccinating 2.3 million of the select groups (100% coverage), while Malawi, despite recourse to force,
succeeded only in vaccinating 1.15 million (74% coverage of select groups). For most policymakers, vaccination
coverage was perceived as successful, despite that vaccination delays and coverage would not have prevented
infection when influenza was at its peak.
Conclusions: While the vaccination strategy was problematic and implemented too late to reduce the effects of the
2009 epidemic, policy makers supported the overall goal of pandemic influenza vaccination to interrupt infection. In
this context, there was strong support for governments engaging in contracts with pharmaceutical companies to
ensure the timely supply of vaccines, and developing well-defined guidelines to address vaccination delays, refusals
and coverage.
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Background
The 2009 influenza pandemic was the first pandemic to
be declared by the World Health Organization (WHO)
in the twenty-first century. By 1 August 2010, over 18,449
laboratory-confirmed influenza-related deaths had been
reported in more than 214 countries and territories [1].
Yet only 168 deaths were reported in Sub-Saharan African
countries [1], with one in Ghana and none in Malawi,
reflecting extreme underreporting as countries failed to
record or stopped recording individual cases where sur-
veillance and monitoring systems were poor [2]. Simonsen
and colleagues [3] and Dawood and colleagues [4] estimate
respectively that mortality was 10 to 15 times higher than
WHO’s estimate, with some 151,700 to 575,400 deaths in
the first year. Of these, around half are estimated to have
occurred in southeast Asia and Africa, where the high
death rates reflected larger immunocompromised popula-
tions due to HIV [5, 6] and inadequate public health infra-
structure, poor sanitation, and poor living conditions [6].
Pandemic influenza poses a serious health threat
globally [7]. Its occurrence is unpredictable, the virus
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spreads rapidly in urban areas and through travel, and
populations’ lack of immunity to novel influenza strains
can result in a rapid spread [8]. The influenza virus
constantly mutates, limiting the impact of protection by
vaccination, and immunity conferred in one pandemic
influenza period will not reliably prevent new infections by
an antigenically drifted strain [9]. New vaccines take at least
6 months to develop [10], during which time WHO recom-
mends the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions includ-
ing increased surveillance and the implementation of such
policies as quarantine, border control and hygiene practices
[11]. Further, the success of influenza vaccination depends
on the timely availability of a vaccine [12], its acceptability
and coverage [12], the ages of those vaccinated [13, 14],
actual vaccine efficacy and effectiveness [15], and, as we
elaborate below, it is negatively affected by operational
shortcomings of influenza vaccination programmes
including delays in influenza importation and distribution
and competing health priorities [16]. A review of national
preparedness plans for Ghana and Malawi suggests many
tasks of planning for and responding to pandemic influ-
enza through influenza vaccination remained unmet,
including those related to influenza surveillance, monitor-
ing and reporting [17, 18].
The global response to the 2009 influenza pandemic
involved the production of 900 million doses of pandemic
influenza vaccines for distribution in low income countries,
with support for their purchase and distribution from
WHO and financial aid from high-income countries [19].
Ghana and Malawi were among the countries to receive
free consignments of the monovalent vaccine [20, 21], but
in both countries, these arrived in May-June 2010, some 8
to 10 months after its first availability in September 2009
and arguably too late in the pandemic to have any signifi-
cant effect on transmission [21, 22]. As we discuss below,
designated high risk groups (health workers, security
personnel, pregnant women and children) in Ghana began
to receive doses of influenza vaccines by mid June 2010,
with H1N1 vaccine deployment continuing into the post
pandemic period. The designated high risk groups in
Malawi were vaccinated only in April 2011, nearly
10 months after the first shipment of vaccines had been
received in June 2010. In this article, we present the results
of a study of policymakers in Ghana and Malawi, their views
on the introduction of the vaccines, the role of vaccination
in prevention and control, and the operational shortcomings
that limited their effectiveness as a public health strategy.
Methods
Research design
A qualitative research study design, with in-depth inter-
views, was adopted to evaluate and understand policy-
maker’s views on vaccination. Ghana and Malawi were
identified from among the 46 countries that attended the
first African Regional Conference on Pandemic Influenza A
(H1N1) in 2009, in which the first author took part. The
two countries were purposively selected based on economic
status, geographical location, influenza surveillance systems,
and the availability of a national pandemic preparedness
plan. These considerations included a number of points of
comparison. Ghana is a lower-middle income economy;
Malawi a low income country with especially limited health
expenditure. Although both countries have health systems
based around primary health care, Ghana’s system is better
established, with a national influenza centre and national
influenza laboratory, and with better hospitals and trained
professionals than Malawi. Ghana and Malawi were among
the first countries in Africa to have developed pandemic
plans. In addition, Ghana and Malawi were feasible and
practical to collect data since both are English-speaking
countries, politically stable and safe, allowing for interviews
and data analysis to be conducted without translation as-
sistance. The comparison between and triangulation of in-
formation derived from these two settings provide the basis
for substantiation and validity [23].
Participants and sampling
Policymakers eligible for the study included people in
country Planning for and Response to Pandemic Influ-
enza (PRPI). At the African Regional Conference on
Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1), held in August 2009 in
Johannesburg, South Africa, four potential interviewees
from Ghana and three from Malawi attending the con-
ference were invited to recommend colleagues, resulting
in an overwhelming response: sometimes one person
would recommend between three and five people. To
ensure a representative sample that would reflect policy-
makers’ views, we wrote to the Ministry of Health in
Malawi and the Ghana Health Service and Ministry of
Health in Ghana requesting a complete list of experts in-
volved in PRPI, including those involved in drafting the
pandemic plans. The number of participants identified
through this process was inadequate to reach a represen-
tative sample, since most of those identified were high
level national experts rather than local, regional or lay
policymakers working at district levels. Consequently,
the first author contacted district and regional health
offices to identify further participants. These included
politicians, environmental health officers, medical and
nurse directors, veterinary officers, executive directors,
scientists, researchers and managers, working within
government, civil society, non-governmental organizations,
and multilateral agencies including WHO (Table 1).
Seventy potential participants were identified in Ghana
and Malawi, but 15 were subsequently excluded because
they did not meet the selection criteria. All eligible partici-
pants were contacted with an official letter, information
sheet, and consent form, sent either by email or fax. Both
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verbal and written consent was required in order to take
part in the study. Five policymakers did not respond and
eventually, 46 participants were interviewed (n = 24
Ghana, n = 22 Malawi, see Table 1). Data generated from
this were sufficient to achieve saturation, when no new
themes or new information were generated.
Data collection
In-depth interviews were used to collect primary data,
and were complemented by a review of the pandemic
plans of the two countries, using the six thematic areas set
out in the WHO checklist [24]: planning and coordination,
surveillance, communication, public health interventions,
patient management, and maintaining essential services.
This enabled us to check and compare respondents’ views
on the levels of preparedness, strengths and gaps for each
country. Data from the pandemic plans were used to for-
mulate interview questions. The interview guide used in
Ghana and Malawi was similar, allowing us to identify vari-
ations or overlaps if any existed between the two countries,
and included the following key questions: (1) How did the
countries prepare and respond to the H1N1 pandemic? (2)
Were there delays in vaccination programmes, and for what
reasons? (3) What were the challenges encountered during
the vaccination period? (4) What was the role of the vac-
cines and vaccination in preventing the spread of infection?
(5) What was the understanding of post pandemic influ-
enza vaccination coverage using a pandemic vaccine? and
(6) What were the perceived benefits of vaccinating in the
post pandemic period?
Table 1 Institutions included and excluded in the study
Ghana interviews = 24 Malawi interviews = 22
1. Ghana Health Service (GHS) Surveillance Department
2. GHS, Public Health
3. Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), Veterinary
Services
4. MOFA, Veterinary Services
5. MOFA, Veterinary Services
6. GHS, National Surveillance Unit
7. Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research (NMIMR)
8. GHS, Upper West Health Directorate
9. National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO)
10. GHS, Management Information Systems
11. World Health Organization (WHO), Expanded Programme
on Immunization (EPI)
12. WHO, EPI
13. GHS, Greater Accra Health Directorate
14. GHS, Ashanti Health Directorate
15. Ghana Red Cross Society (GRCS)
16. World Bank, Ghana
17. USAID, Ghana
18. UNICEF, Ghana
19. Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines (MLFM)
20. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Ghana
21. Department of Defense (DOD)
22. Quality Health Partners, Ghana
23. GHS, Child Health Team
24. Politician, Ghana
25. Department of Disaster Management Authority (DODMA)
26. Care International, Malawi
27. Ministry of Health (MoH), EPI National Task Force
28. FAO, Malawi
29. Malawi Red Cross Society (MRCS)
30. Nations Newspaper
31. College of Medicine, UNIMA
32. MoH, Preventive Health Services
33. MoH, Community Health Science Unit
34. MoH, Pandemic Preparedness Unit
35. Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), Avian Influenza
36. Blantyre City Council, Health
37. World Bank, Avian Preparedness
38. MoA, Animal Health
39. Malawi Police Service
40. Catholic Development Commission in Malawi (CADECOM)
41. Lilongwe City Council, Health
42. USAID, Avian Preparedness
43. MoH, Kamuzu Central Hospital
44. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Malawi
45. Lay Person, Rumphi District
46. Malawi Army, Health
Institutions excluded from the study = 15 Declined interview Ghana & Malawi = 5 Institutions not interviewed due to data
saturation = 4
47. Ghana Education Service (GES)
48. Ministries of Water Resources Works and Housing
MWRWH, Ghana
49. Politician and advocate, Ghana
50. GHS, Public health
51. GHS, Child Health Team
52. GHS, EPI and Logistics
53. Ghana Police Services
54. Department of Wildlife, Ghana
55. Episcopal Conference of Malawi (ECM)
56. World Vision, Malawi
57. Malawi Council of Churches
58. Ministry of the Interior, Ghana
59. Lay Person, Ghana
60. Lay Person, Malawi
61. National Health Sciences Research Committee (NHSRC),
Malawi
62. Politician, Ghana
63. GHS, Communicable Diseases
64. Centre for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), Ghana
65. GHS, Volta Health Directorate
66. MoH, Malawi
67. Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital, Ghana
68. GHS, Epidemiology and AIDS
Department
69. GHS, Planning Department
70. Catholic Health Association of
Malawi (CHAM)
Numbers in the table represent participants identified through snowballing process
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In both countries, interviews were mainly conducted
in the interviewees’ offices or in cafés and hotel lobbies,
lasting on average 50 min. Interviews were conducted in
January – May 2012 in Ghana, and September 2012 –
January 2013 in Malawi, with time between the two
countries for reflection and provisional analysis of the
data. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed
verbatim. Ethics approval was obtained from the Medical
School Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Nottingham, UK and the Ministry of Health in Ghana
and Malawi to ensure the highest integrity and quality of
the study.
Data analysis
Data analysis was ongoing from the first interview, with
the first author listening and re-listening to the audio re-
cordings to gain familiarity with the data and allow for
iteration, with notes entered into a data analysis logbook.
All transcribed interviews were exported to NVivo 8 to
facilitate the coding and retrieval process, and organised
as cases. For example, respondents from Ghana and
Malawi were labelled as case nodes with reference to the
organization represented. During coding, text was exam-
ined closely, line by line, prior to generating codes and
analytic themes. Preliminary themes that did not fit particu-
lar data extracts were redefined or discarded. The final
phase involved searching selective coding, with re-emerging
themes further defined and refined. Data extracted were
eventually coded for preparedness, responses, herd immun-
ity, perceived benefits of vaccines, vaccine coverage, timing
of vaccination, vaccination strategies, refusal of vaccines,
and politics, as we elaborate below.
Results
In total, as noted above, 46 out of 50 participants were
interviewed in Ghana (24) and Malawi (22), representing
a 90% response rate to original invitations to participate.
Building on the codes generated during analysis, seven
main themes were identified: (1) pandemic preparedness
and responses (2) vaccine coverage (3) late timing of
vaccination and the politics that influenced this, (4) per-
ceived herd immunity (5) perceived benefits of vaccine
in relation to seasonal influenza, (6) refusal to vaccinate,
and (7) frustrations with vaccination strategies.
Pandemic preparedness and response
Figure 1 provides a timeline of H5N1 (avian influenza)
and H1N1 (pandemic influenza) outbreaks in Ghana and
Malawi, and the significant milestones achieved in terms
of preparedness and responses.
Preparation prior to the 2009 pandemic influenza in
Ghana and Malawi evolved around the six sub-themes of
preparedness, i.e. prevention and containment, health sys-
tem, coordination, influenza surveillance, communication,
and maintaining essential services. As reflected in the
national plans, national pandemic preparedness policies
in Ghana and Malawi were deployed to respond to the
2009 pandemic influenza. Both countries planned to
prevent and contain influenza by using non-pharma-
ceutical interventions (quarantine, closing schools and
other public places, isolation of suspected cases and
border control) and pharmaceutical interventions (anti-
viral drugs, pandemic vaccines and antibiotics). Both
countries planned to mount early surveillance systems to
detect the threat of pandemic and to determine human
resource and operational capacity to respond to this. This
involved establishing communication and reporting sched-
ules. Other planning efforts involved strengthening leader-
ship capacity and identifying funds for the implementation
of the pandemic plans, including for influenza education,
human resources and laboratory surveillance. Emphasis
was also placed on frequent interactions among lead agen-
cies, partners and local and international stakeholders.
Non-health preparations, such as a business contingency
plan and ethics plans, were not part of the national
preparedness.
Both countries prepared for the deployment of pan-
demic influenza vaccines and vaccination, However, in
both cases, vaccination strategies were weak, for ex-
ample, failing to account for specific issues around
vaccine procurement, storage, distribution, liability,
and licensing. While both countries specified the need
to acquire antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir and
zanamivir, and masks and gowns, neither anticipated
challenges relating to the scarcity of vaccines and other
pharmaceutical products.
While seasonal influenza is prevalent and a major
economic burden, neither Ghana nor Malawi included
within the vaccination strategy a plan to vaccinate sea-
sonally. In addition, they did not include detailed plans
for the recruitment of temporary or additional health
workers and volunteers were pandemic influenza vac-
cination required, or to care for people infected during
a pandemic. Plans did not address how health care de-
livery systems might manage care in limited resource
settings – for example, how to maintain existing centres
for influenza immunization or when to close vaccination
clinics, when real-time information on supplies of and
demand for influenza vaccine doses were unavailable.
Neither country included plans for police to maintain
peace and order, nor to provide quarantine facilities for
travellers. Communication with local stakeholders such
as chiefs, private hospitals and mortuaries, was not ad-
dressed, and arrangements for home care for patients
were not considered. Further, neither country considered
public-private partnerships that might be necessary for
continuity of essential services such as water, energy and
safe transport.
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To validate country responses, respondents were asked
how they had prepared and responded to the 2009 pan-
demic influenza. Respondents drew on diverse discourse
to explain the varying roles: some focused on measures
undertaken to reduce the effects of pandemic influenza,
such as antiviral drug treatment during and post pan-
demic; others recounted that implementation failed to
account for the delivery of effective risk communications
to prepare the public to respond. One of the most fre-
quent themes in the interviews, in both Ghana and
Malawi, was that implementation of pandemic prepared-
ness and responses was “clumsy” and “incomplete.” One
policymaker representing a regional office of the Ministry
of Health in Malawi said, “I say always that our responses
to pandemic influenza were frustrating and lacked clarity.”
A policymaker from Ghana Health Service remarked that
“we (the health service) did not do well, but our responses
to the pandemic influenza were as satisfactory as the as-
sumptions on which they were proposed.”
Despite the numerous challenges and the frustration
that policymakers expressed, many milestones were
achieved in response to the pandemic. For example, both
Ghana and Malawi quickly set up special advisory com-
mittees on pandemic influenza within their health minis-
tries to oversee the implementation of the pandemic
plans. As part of the responses effort, Ghana and Malawi
participated in the African Regional Conference on Pan-
demic Influenza A (H1N1) in Johannesburg, as noted
above. In addition, both countries entered into a formal
agreement with WHO for the deployment of donated
H1N1 vaccines on 10 April 2010, after submitting a let-
ter of intent (LOI) to the Director General of WHO in
response to a call for this on 22 September 2009. After
receiving the vaccines, Ghana acted quickly to vaccinate
select groups in a relatively short period of 4 weeks.
Malawi, however, was able only to administer the vaccina-
tions over 200 days after the vaccines had been delivered.
Earlier in the epidemic, however, the Ministry of Health
in Malawi developed a partnership with a reference la-
boratory in Kenya to send early signals to ensure a
health service response. Ghana participated in the
Influenza Surveillance Network (FluNet), a global tool
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Fig. 1 Timeline of pandemic influenzas and significant milestones in Malawi and Ghana
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for surveillance setup by the WHO, to report and share
its limited influenza real-data electronically with the
rest of the world.
Despite the lack of laboratories and capacity for sur-
veillance, through the Integrated Disease Surveillance
and Response (IDSR) system, Malawi established surveil-
lance at ports of entry, with routine checks for suspected
cases and suspected samples sent to Kenya for diagnos-
tic confirmation. These were returned after 2–3 weeks.
Through this process, Malawi was able to register four
confirmed cases and no deaths. Surveillance response in
Ghana was better because Ghana had surveillance infra-
structures such as the Noguchi Memorial Institute for
Medical Research (NMIMR), which provides oversight
of the national influenza centre in Accra, Ghana. Two
staff from NMIMR were trained in Cairo, Egypt in influ-
enza diagnosis and virus characterization. During the
pandemic influenza period, NMIMR identified six sites
for sentinel surveillance of influenza viruses and procured
a real-time PCR machine and reagents to improve data
reporting. Surveillance of pandemic influenza and moni-
toring were conducted at borders of entry during the post
and pandemic periods. Schools were closed. For example,
Lincoln Community School, located in Accra, Ghana and
the site of a localised outbreak with two percent of 700
students identified as confirmed cases, was closed to break
the cycle of transmission. A total of 345 specimens
(294 suspected cases and 51 contacts) were investigated
at the NMIMR, with 38 confirmed as positive for the
H1N1 virus.
Communication about the disease was promoted
through various communication channels such as radio,
TV and leaflets. In Ghana, telephone hotlines were
established to inform the general public on issues relat-
ing to influenza, such as protocols and triage decisions
regarding access to limited vaccines in moderate and
worst-case scenarios. In Malawi, communications mes-
sages initially mainly targeted poultry farmers against
the H5N1 subtypes, but during the pre-pandemic period,
as part of a new strategy, switched to the 2009 H1N1
pandemic and targeted health workers and the general
population. Policymakers who were interviewed empha-
sized that responses to pandemic influenza should occur
in a timely manner on what is known about the disease,
in order to generally improve communication, public
knowledge and perception about the disease.
Neither country communicated with the public on
how soon vaccines would be made available or how ef-
fective they would be against the virus. A policymaker
representing the Ghana Health Service commented that
“the likely nature or duration of the pandemic influenza,
its spread, its peak and decline” was never sufficiently
stressed and “nor did officials sufficiently inform the
public on the use and safety of vaccines.” Respondents
expressed a deep sense of dissatisfaction over the pan-
demic influenza response to the outbreak and the inability
of their governments to respond effectively. All respon-
dents talked about how responses were affected by lack of
critical infrastructure for preparedness such as surveil-
lance and financial resources, and the lack of operational
resources. As a result they characterised national strategic
plans on pandemic influenza as “inflexible” and “unre-
sponsive” to many operational aspects, including mainten-
ance of essential services, patient management services,
and public health action.
Vaccine coverage
Theme two focused on the donation of vaccines to
Ghana and Malawi from the WHO, sufficient for 10% of
the risk population of the respective countries. Policy-
makers were asked about the number of people vaccinated
with the 2009 pandemic vaccine. In Malawi, around 1.15
million people, mostly pregnant women and children,
were vaccinated, and around 75% of the supplies from
WHO were used for this purpose. The remaining 25% of
the WHO supplies were unaccounted for. Policymakers in
Ghana maintained that they had used all the vaccines sup-
plies donated by the WHO, ensuring a 100% vaccine
coverage of the risk population with 2.3 million doses of
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) pdm09 vaccines targeting
health workers, security personnel, pregnant women and
children. The decision to target “at risk” groups was based
on the WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts (SAGE)
on immunisation which recommended vaccinating health
care workers as first priority to protect the essential health
infrastructure, and then vaccinating to reduce morbidity
and mortality among pregnant women, children over
6 months to 11 years of age, and vulnerable people includ-
ing those with chronic diseases (Table 2). Given the cover-
age needed for vaccines to prevent the spread of infection,
this low coverage would not have been effective, as it
would not have served the affected population.
Most policymakers stated that the quantity of vaccines
that they received fell well short of the supply needed to
enable acceptable coverage to stop the virus from circu-
lating. For most policymakers, procurement of enough
vaccine supplies was hampered by lack of clear planning
on vaccination. A senior officer from the Food and Agri-
culture Organization in Ghana acknowledged: “Honestly,
do we even have a vaccine strategy? Because the one I
have seen is poorly designed, unable to support efforts
to secure enough pandemic vaccines or improve vaccine
uptake.”
Many policymakers believed that their countries lacked
a vital information system and operations capabilities that
would support the deployment of vaccines to a large
group of people, even if limited to target groups such as
pregnant women and children. In addition, there were no
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debates within government on the best way to coordinate
vaccination programmes to ensure on-time availability
and high coverage. Policymakers from the Ministries of
Health in both countries referred to weak planning sys-
tems in the national preparedness plans and the lack of
interest by the government to invest in vaccine research,
development and production, which might have facilitated
the management and execution of the vaccine deployment
operations.
Politics and timing
Most policymakers in Malawi identified operational gaps
specifically around vaccinating the target population late
in the post pandemic period. All policymakers agreed
that vaccination started late, and while the purpose of
the vaccine was to protect people from acquiring the
disease during the pandemic period, this did not happen
since the disease had abated at the time of vaccination.
Reviews of the weekly and monthly distribution of cases
suggest that the majority of cases of H1N1 (90%) was re-
ported in 2009, reaching its peak during August and
September; only 10% of lab confirmed cases occurred in
2010 [22]. The vaccines were delivered late mainly due
to the late release of operational funds from WHO,
competing priorities, and the reduced severity of the
pandemic. Neither Ghana nor Malawi had direct access
to vaccines, and so relied on donor countries to make
vaccines available to the WHO for countries that could
otherwise not afford the vaccine. The vaccine pledges to
the WHO also depended on donor countries satisfying
their local requirements to meet their own vaccination
targets before they were able and willing to assist poor
countries; in addition, availability sometimes depended
on vaccine production schedules. A policymaker work-
ing as a district health officer in rural Malawi also al-
luded to the late arrival of vaccines as a result of the
WHO preconditions for supply of vaccines: “You know,
before the WHO donates vaccines, they demand that re-
cipient countries apply and meet the preconditions for
supply of vaccines within the WHO Deployment Initia-
tive.” A policymaker representing a non-health depart-
ment concerned with disasters in Malawi wondered how
such a country without a strong legal framework to sup-
port vaccine licensing or registration could be required
to meet these preconditions for supply of vaccines in a
pandemic situation.
The reasons for the late arrival of vaccines and imple-
menting pandemic influenza vaccination programmes
were said by respondents to have been driven by “polit-
ics” and “hidden agendas.” Three policymakers from
Ghana and Malawi believed that pharmaceutical com-
panies were paid in advance by rich countries to produce
vaccines for poor countries; thus the pharmaceutical
companies had an obligation to produce and supply the
requested vaccines to poor countries regardless of when
they could do so. These policymakers believed that their
governments had then to deliver the vaccinations for
“financial” and “political” reasons. For example, a
Table 2 Target groups and deployed vaccination strategies against pandemic influenza
Vaccination Strategies in Ghana and Malawi
1. To vaccinate within 7 days after receiving the vaccines.
2. To vaccination in phase i.e. to cover 2% of the population followed by 8%.
3. To first vaccinate 2% of HCW to protect the integrity of the health-care system and the country’s critical infrastructure.
4. To reduce morbidity and mortality among pregnant women.
5. To reduce transmission of the pandemic virus within communities by vaccinating children.
6. To undertake public awareness campaigns through TV, radio and print media.
Target groups Ghana (100%) Malawi (75%)
Health-care workers (HCW) Vaccination teams visited each health facility after an
education campaign. More campaigns undertaken to
improve uptake. HCW and security personnel voluntary
got vaccinated first without incentives.
Vaccination teams visited health facilities accompanied
by an educational campaign. Due to low uptake,
vaccination teams deploy the police force
Pregnant women Vaccination teams visited maternal clinics and held one
to one sessions. Programme supported Information,
Education and Communication (IEC) to change attitudes
and perceptions. More campaigns undertaken to
improve uptake.
Vaccination teams visited maternal clinics accompanied
by an educational campaign. More Information,
Education and Communication (IEC) campaigns to
change attitudes and perceptions. Due to low uptake,
vaccination teams deploy the police force.
Children aged 6 months to
11 years:
Mobile vaccination teams visiting nurseries and schools
supported by Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) on attitudes and perceptions.
More campaigns undertaken to improve uptake.
Vaccination teams visited under-five clinics accompanied
by an educational campaign. More Information, Education
and Communication (IEC) campaigns to change attitudes
and perceptions. Due to low uptake, vaccination teams
deploy the police force.
Population
Immunocompromised (HIV/AIDS)
and vulnerable people such as
the elderly.
Vaccinated via routine antenatal clinics at all levels of
health care delivery. More campaigns undertaken to
improve uptake.
Not targeted
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policymaker from Malawi cited that through certain
public health officials and politicians, his government
had pursued post pandemic influenza vaccination in
order to obtain money from the WHO, which was
largely spent on training, transportation and per diems
associated with the vaccination programme. In other in-
stances, vaccination programmes were seen to be influ-
enced by foreign expertise, external funding and foreign
policies. In general, most representatives working in gov-
ernment and NGOs in both countries blamed their gov-
ernments for the late acquisition of vaccines and the
failure of the WHO to speed up delivery from Septem-
ber 2009 when the vaccine was available. A senior repre-
sentative policymaker in the Ministry of Health in
Malawi captured this vividly: “It was unexpected that the
Malawi government and WHO could not arrange or de-
liver vaccines until July 2010 and kept them until April
2011, arguably well into the post pandemic period.” Rep-
resentatives from the WHO from both countries consid-
ered the failure to make vaccines available on time was
due to the complex legal systems related to liability,
regulatory registration and vaccine licensing. For in-
stance, the role of licenses for vaccine use changed out-
side the pandemic period, and the WHO demanded that
the recipient countries register the vaccine with national
regulatory bodies before the product could be imported
or distributed. In normal circumstances in Ghana and
Malawi, drug registration could take a long time and sig-
nificant resources. Most policymakers were aware that
vaccines might not arrive on time. A policymaker from a
humanitarian organization in Malawi emphasized this: “I
know during the first few months there will be no vac-
cines, and this is the reason vaccination is not the pri-
mary intervention method in dealing with pandemic
influenza.” Policymakers expected that their national
planning systems would have attempted to secure vac-
cine supplies in time for their population by engaging in
possible contracts with pharmaceutical companies. A
representative from WHO, Ghana, explained that “if the
government can’t clearly demonstrate that it is trying to
help its people, then how do you expect foreign partners
to help you?”
Perceived herd immunity and benefits for seasonal
influenza
When specifically asked about the vaccination coverage
of the 10% “risk group” against the H1N1 pandemic in-
fluenza, many policymakers commented that “vaccines
save lives,” especially if used rapidly and widely once the
vaccine is available. For example, one policymaker from
the Ghana Health Service stated, “I am sure vaccines are
among the proven strategies to address an influenza
pandemic if they are made available on time and widely.”
Most policymakers suggested, but did not directly
express, that the 10% of risk population vaccine coverage
in a given country would be adequate to achieve herd
immunity. On the other hand, a representative from
World Bank, Malawi, who was confident of the role of a
vaccine to prevent infections, explained: “It’s not rocket
science, but vaccines are vital to stop the spread of influ-
enza during the pandemic.” But the benefits of the vac-
cines were minimal and questionable because they were
offered well after the disease had abated.
Some policymakers, who thought that the vaccines
were beneficial despite timing of their delivery, related
their usefulness to achieving protective benefits. As a
representative from United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) in Malawi explained, “of course,
it was difficult to convince everybody on the vaccines’
benefits related to indirect risk reduction associated with
herd immunity.” A senior policymaker from the Ministry
of Food and Agriculture, Ghana, involved with H5N1
pandemic planning, commented that “herd immunity
was possible but would require a lot of vaccines to go
around – more than 10% of the risk population – and
depended on whether the government could afford it.” A
few policymakers commented that while wide vaccine
coverage was important, it would not have attained herd
immunity and so stop the virus from circulating; this
would have required everyone’s cooperation in being
vaccinated.
Apart from the benefits of post pandemic vaccination
against H1N1 influenza in reducing symptomatic cases
and deaths, participants drew attention to the perceived
benefits of vaccines, after the pandemic period, against
seasonal influenza virus. One policymaker with the
Community Health Sciences Unit, Malawi, commented:
“As far as I know it provided protective effects in sus-
ceptible persons against the viral strain of influenza
matched to the vaccine that was circulating as seasonal
influenza.” The 2009 H1N1 virus was antigenically un-
changed in the 2010/11 season, and it is likely that it
would have infected vulnerable groups in the form of
seasonal influenza. There was general consensus that the
vaccines rendered benefits among those vaccinated, but
this depended on other factors such as vaccine efficacy,
effectiveness, age of person vaccinated, and their im-
munological status.
Refusals and enforcement
The H1N1 vaccine deployment activities in Ghana and
Malawi continued for a period of over 6 months from
receiving the vaccine. The distribution of vaccine was
planned to follow the routine Expanded Programme on
Immunizations (EPI) distribution system supported by
the EPI national task force in coordinating the country
response to the pandemic.
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Vaccination refusal emerged as a theme among respon-
dents, in relation to the willingness of people identified as
“risks groups” to be vaccinated. Nearly all policymakers
interviewed commented on people’s resistance to vaccin-
ation, and two thirds of policymakers recounted their
struggles to convince people identified as at risk of the im-
portance of being vaccinated. One policymaker working
for Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical Research,
Ghana, recalled: “I think people had negative attitudes to-
wards the vaccination programme because they lacked in-
formation about the influenza vaccine and the perceived
health risk associated to these [vaccines].” Another senior
policymaker with the Ghana Health Service maintained
that recipients’ reasons for refusal were that they didn’t
understand why they had to be vaccinated after the disease
had ended.
Most policymakers believed that refusal to be vacci-
nated related to multiple uncertainties regarding the
safety of the vaccines. For example, recipients who were
healthy feared that if they were vaccinated, they would
“fall sick,” and there were rumours that the vaccine
could lead to major complications such as “infertility” or
“insanity.” As a district health officer in Ghana narrated,
“aahh … people from rural areas think these vaccines are
birth control medicines whose only purpose is to stop
families from child bearing.” Most policymakers in
Malawi cited that people refused vaccination on “reli-
gious grounds” and because of “cultural beliefs.” Most
importantly, there was mistrust in the vaccination
programme and particularly the authorities. Misinforma-
tion and unfounded fears in Malawi followed from the
Mass Drug Administration (MDA) programme to treat
and prevent the further transmission of schistosomiasis
and helminth infections, including the alleged death of a
school boy after taking the drug praziquantel. After this
incident, there was widespread concern and cries of out-
rage at the severe adverse effects of the drug experienced
by school children in a number of schools across the
country.
Despite vaccine refusals, both countries achieved very
high rates of vaccination. At the start of the programme,
low uptake of vaccines was common especially among
religious groups such as members of the Zion Apostolic
Church. To increase uptake, the Malawi government
called in the police to assist with the vaccination by gun-
point, which one policymaker from the Ministry of
Health explained as necessary “to be done.” The strategy
in Malawi involved forcing targeted recipients to get
vaccinated against their will or, as most policymakers
described it, “threatening them with the police.” A few
policymakers from Malawi believed this would help
overcome refusals. However, most policymakers be-
lieved that the forced implementation of vaccination
risked stigmatising the populations they were meant to
protect and that the intimidation of targeted populations
to enforce vaccination would have long term problems.
One policymaker from the College of Medicine, Malawi
explained: “I don’t get decisions that force unwilling re-
cipients using threats to participate in what should be
voluntary vaccination to increase uptake. (This) was
not a good idea and would damage the good reputation
of the country health service.”
In Ghana, despite initial low uptake, there was no vio-
lence, and vaccines were not administered to reluctant
members of the population by force. Most policymakers
in Ghana recounted struggles to reach the target groups,
but this was resolved by educating target groups on the
need for vaccines using media, pamphlets and one-to-
one sessions. These techniques led to improved uptake.
One policymaker from the Ghana Health Service reiter-
ated that it was important to encourage target groups to
come forward for vaccination without incentives or force.
Discussion
In this article, we have presented policymakers’ views on
vaccination in the context of preventing transmission
during the post pandemic influenza period, and evalu-
ated the concept of vaccinating target groups after the
influenza infections had abated. The pandemic vaccines
only became available to recipients in Ghana in June
2010, and the deployment of vaccines continued over
6 months longer than the time desired in pandemic situ-
ations. The pandemic vaccines were available in Malawi
in July 2010, but were only used from April 2011, nearly
2 years after the beginning of the 2009 pandemic influ-
enza outbreak. The general policy of WHO is to deploy
vaccines and supplies within seven days of the arrival of
vaccines [22]. Delayed vaccination inevitably reduces the
effectiveness of pandemic influenza control.
For example, policymakers cited the initial refusal of
“at risk” groups to be vaccinated due to the late availabil-
ity and administration of the influenza vaccination. The
use of the pandemic influenza vaccines to prevent pan-
demic influenza would have been effective only if they
had been administered early in the pandemic. By April
2011, the pandemic had abated and the impact of the
vaccine on reducing serious morbidity and mortality
would have been minimal, although the delayed vaccin-
ation might have protected against the pandemic influenza
virus if it were actively circulating as seasonal influenza in
the post pandemic period.
Recent studies highlight the importance of timely vac-
cination against influenza among at-risk populations to
maximize the public health benefits [14, 25]. Borse and
colleagues [12] have shown in the US that the effective-
ness of the influenza vaccine in reducing symptomatic
cases at population level was greatly influenced by the
timing of vaccine availability in relation to the timing of
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disease activity. In Ghana and Malawi, however, as we
have described, vaccinations did not start in a timely
manner. This is unlikely to change in the near future.
On the basis of the pandemic plans for both countries,
the vaccination strategy remained unmet and fell short
of implementation drills or simulations to test plans for
an imminent threat of a future pandemic influenza. The
lack of resources to purchase vaccines suggests that
these countries will continue to rely on donations; these
often come with preconditions and complex legal re-
quirements around liability, regulatory registration and
vaccine licensing. We do not suggest waiving or lower-
ing these much-needed preconditions for the supply of
vaccines to ensure quality and safety, but governments
might need to streamline and expedite the negotiation
process, firstly by aligning their country legal frame-
works with the global legal systems.
Policymakers believed that delays in vaccination could
be reduced significantly if their governments engaged in
contracts with pharmaceutical companies to supply vac-
cines, rather than relying on WHO donations when
needed. This is consistent with a well-funded and struc-
tured strategy to ensure the rapid procurement of vaccine
supplies and delivery to the points of vaccination [26]. Be-
cause vaccination efforts were severely hampered by re-
sources at the time of the 2009 pandemic, policymakers
suggested shifting planning priorities from being fully
committed to addressing the consequences and effects of
the pandemic, to preventing it from occurring in the first
place, through border management and cluster control.
This would require routine surveillance activities such as
sentinel reporting of influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe
acute respiratory infections (SARI) using various ap-
proaches such as outpatient illness surveillance, a pyramid
of severity, and the use of RT-PCR machines or a rapid in-
fluenza diagnostic test (RIDT) to identify early warning
signs of new events [27]. This would improve the oper-
ational capacity to assess, monitor and track surveillance
data relevant to determine the mortality, attack rates and
admission rates of influenza, especially in countries that
reported low cases. Epidemiological data for seasonal
influenza could be used as a predictive indicator to aid
estimates of vaccines needed for pandemic influenza
vaccination and additional capacities required to address
the pandemic.
The implementation of pandemic influenza vaccina-
tions were slow and frustrating in Ghana and Malawi,
with the strategy perceived to have failed because vac-
cine recipients were not adequately informed about the
vaccine efficacy and effectivess, its benefits and possible
safety risks. Within pandemic influenza vaccination pro-
grammes, recipients need to be made aware about the
effectiveness and safety of vaccines, with clear advice
that vaccines cannot be 100% safe and effective. Exposing
simple and open information on the benefits and risks
to recipients may assist with compliance and people’s
willingness to be vaccinated. In childhood immunisation
programmes, recipients are fully informed, thus there is
high acceptance and coverage [28]. Pandemic influenza
vaccination is not a routine intervention; it is a relatively
new approach of targeting a diverse group of people in-
cluding children. The lack of information on the safety of
pandemic vaccines, and the logic for delayed vaccination,
justifies why targeted risk groups were not interested in
being vaccinated once the pandemic had ended. Pregnant
women and health care workers were initially hesitant be-
cause they felt that they were being used as guinea pigs for
pharmaceutical interventions.
In this study, most policymakers were aware of the
mistrust, doubts and concerns among people in relation
to delayed influenza vaccination. While this affected vac-
cine acceptability, because of the contracts signed with
the vaccine donor, the governments of Ghana and
Malawi both felt they were obligated to vaccinate at any
cost. Accordingly, pandemic influenza vaccination took
place either by convincing or forcing the target risk
groups to be vaccinated. For decision makers, the imple-
mentation of the influenza vaccination spanning from
pandemic to post pandemic was interpreted as a stra-
tegic opportunity to protect susceptible persons against
the matched viral strain of pandemic influenza virus that
was expected to continue to circulate as a seasonal influ-
enza strain. This led some policymakers to justify that
susceptible groups be offered vaccines to enjoy the pro-
tective effects of the vaccination, at least to some extent.
This finding resonates with the agenda of the WHO that
recommends the vaccination of people in high risks
groups during post pandemic, since possible circulation
of the pandemic virus as seasonal influenza cannot reliably
be predicted [29]. The limitation to this sort of justifica-
tion was that in Malawi and Ghana, there was scant data,
and with poor surveillance, it was difficult to ascertain
whether the pandemic viral strain was in fact circulating
as seasonal influenza.
Without adequate information and understanding
among policymakers on what might constitute “reasonable
coverage” of the influenza vaccine, most policymakers not
directly involved in influenza vaccination decisions per-
ceived that, should the virus return, the influenza vaccin-
ation strategy implied indirect risk reduction associated
with herd immunity. In this study, a number of policy-
makers made explicit assumptions that 10% coverage
would be sufficient to establish herd immunity and so
reduce risk. However, key literature on herd immunity
supports 75–90% vaccination coverage to achieve herd
immunity against influenza [30]. For example, one
study reported herd immunity for influenza to be 85%,
proven by immunizing school children with a single
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dose of a monovalent A(H3N2) inactivated vaccine so
to reduce the disease burden in the unvaccinated popu-
lation [13]. In another study in nursing homes, vaccin-
ation of more than 70% of residents resulted in herd
immunity [31]. This corresponds to a study by re-
searchers in Japan, where more than 80% vaccination
coverage against influenza in school children between
1962 and 1987 led to a significant reduction in mortal-
ity in the elderly and adults [14].
Our results indicate that the success of vaccine use
will depend on a range of factors, including clarity of the
pandemic influenza preparedness plans and response in
terms of influenza surveillance, risk communication,
prevention and containment. All these could inform the
significance of influenza vaccine coverage in terms of
herd immunity or other perceived benefits, increase ac-
ceptance levels, and ensure timely vaccination. This
suggests the need for defined goals for vaccination
based on different variables. For example, WHO SAGE
recommended that health care workers get vaccinated
first to protect the integrity of the health system. How-
ever, where vaccines are limited, a simulation model
suggests that vaccinating 20% of school children would
be more likely to reduce influenza related mortality in
the elderly than would be the case by vaccinating 90%
of persons of age 64 or older [32]. Another study has
shown that vaccinating healthy adults yields very mod-
est effects in reducing influenza symptoms and working
days lost in the general population, including among
pregnant women [33]. Vaccinating the elderly and at
risk adults is unlikely to establish indirect protective ef-
fects because these groups represent a small percentage
of the population among whom the virus spreads. The
attack rates for the elderly and at risk adults are rela-
tively low and the vaccine efficacy maybe reduced due
to compromised immune systems due to age [34], de-
clining vaccine induced antibody titres, or poor health.
Children older than 2 years will respond better to the
vaccine than the elderly, who have a declining immuno-
logical function due to aging. It is thus important to
target children when there are limited doses of vaccine
coverage, in order to establish secondary effects in the
population, so to ensure that many older people enjoy
protection offered by the children’s role in vaccination.
Policymakers expressed concern that members of tar-
get groups were unwilling to receive vaccines due to
concerns about vaccine safety and religious beliefs. This
suggests that there was not enough information about
vaccination, during or after the pandemic. This observa-
tion corresponds to suggestions that understandings of
the heightened risk will lead to people taking action to
protect their wellbeing [35]. Through the use of Infor-
mation, Education and Communication, Ghana was able
to tackle vaccination refusal and the sub-optimal uptake
was reported to improve to 100%. In contrast, Malawi
opted to deploy the police and force high-risk groups to
be vaccinated, both on the basis that people were reluctant
to volunteer for vaccination and to avoid vaccines been
thrown away. Forcing people to take the vaccine supports
the view that authorities aspired to satisfy vaccine donors’
requirements for high influenza vaccination coverage.
Health providers who received the vaccine were required
to use their vaccine supplies [36]. According to Garoon
and Duggan ([37], see also Tyler, [38]), the use of force has
clear political ramifications. The approach adopted in
Malawi raises ethical concerns and tarnished the reputa-
tion of public health enforcement officers, while damaging
how vaccination policies are viewed [25]. According to
Kotalik [39], more information on the benefits and burden
of vaccines would set the stage for a more successful vol-
untary vaccination programme, thus avoiding an ethically
problematic mandatory programme. Effective communi-
cation is critical for gaining public trust and participating
in community measures to contain infection, including
vaccination [26].
Despite the important findings, this study had methodo-
logical limits related to interviews and data analysis. The in-
clusion of lay people would have enhanced understanding
the multiple factors affecting community vaccine coverage
and acceptance. In addition, despite attempts to recruit a
representative sample, some crucial policymakers directly
involved in writing the pandemic influenza preparedness
plans for both Ghana and Malawi were unavailable or
failed to consent to participate in the study. This may have
had an effect on the generalizability of the findings. There
was also a potential for recall bias since the study was con-
ducted a year after the deployment of influenza vaccin-
ation programme and 2 years after the pandemic had
subsided. The use of computer-assisted qualitative data
analysis software (CAQDAS) such as NVivo often creates
a distance between the researcher, respondents and the
data which can arguably distort data analysis [40]. How-
ever, this was resolved through the first author’s familiarity
with the empirical data and the second author’s checking
of the data, codes and themes created by the software.
This data-checking process ensured that the analysis and
findings do not suffer from inter-coder unreliability. Reli-
ability was further enhanced by the author’s familiarity
with the African context. However, future research that
replicates our method in other African countries or re-
peats our study with a random sample can improve the
validity of our findings.
Conclusion
Vaccines provide good protection against pandemic in-
fluenza if administered at the earliest possible time of
the outbreak, preferably within 4 to 6 months of out-
break, and if a large population of people are targeted
Sambala and Manderson BMC Public Health  (2017) 17:227 Page 11 of 13
to achieve herd immunity. This study illustrates the dif-
ficulty in achieving this when donated vaccines do not
arrive on time and in sufficient amounts. The delays
experienced by Ghana and Malawi significantly affected
the levels of acceptability of vaccines among targeted
groups, and informed misunderstandings about vaccine
coverage, which most policymakers perceived to be suf-
ficient to establish herd immunity and reduce the risk
of further influenza. These barriers can be addressed by
developing stronger national influenza preparedness
plans to respond to pandemic influenza, which incorp-
orate the rapid procurement of the vaccine supplies
and delivery to the points of vaccination, and guidelines
for information, education and communication to avoid
sub-optimal uptake. Delays in vaccines can also be tackled
if governments engage in advance contracts and agree-
ments with pharmaceutical companies for supplies of vac-
cines as soon as they become available. This will reduce
unnecessary reliance on donations. In general, pandemic
planning needs to take into account the realities of vaccine
availability, timing, coverage, and refusals, and the role of
herd immunity, while paying attention to political influ-
ences that divert the goals of an effective vaccination
programme. Most importantly, to deal with pandemic in-
fluenza more effectively, non-pharmaceutical interventions
including increased surveillance and the implementation of
such policies as quarantine, border control and hygiene
practices remain important as the mainstay methods of
dealing with a pandemic influenza.
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